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570 ANNALS OF IOWA
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF GEN. U. S. GRANT.
BY MAJ. GEN. GREN\TL.IJE M . DODGE.
For twenty years following the death of General Grant,
I was at the head of the Grant Birthday Association of New
York City. At it'i meeting on each birthday gathered srutes-
men, diplomats and distinguished citizens of our country to
honor his niemorj'. Of all tbe great, eloquent and interesting
tributes paid to him, it waa the opinion of the Association
that two of the best and most eloquent were delivered by
Iowa men, Robert G. Cousins and John S. Runnells.
It is a fact not generally known, that after every successful
battle, after every campaign that General Grant was engaged
in, almost before the dead upon the field were buried, he had
made in his own mind a plan for the using of the army com-
posed of veterans that had already fought and won the bat-
tle, to move immediately again upon the enemy. Ever;^ one
of those plans, up to ßlarch, 1864, was disapproved. In some
cases he was relieved of command, in others his armies were
distriliuted over the country and did not accomplish much
for a year.
General Grant started out as Colonel of the Twenty-first
Illinois Infantry. His first movement upon the enemy was
from Haünil>al, Jlissoni'i. He was ordered out to a plaee
called Florida, Missouri, to attack Colonel Harris, who was in
command of a Confederate force there. He used to tell us
with what great trepidation and fear he went on that trip,
and he described it a great deal better than I can. He said:
As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected
we could see Harris' camp and possibly find bis men ready formed
to meet ns, my heart kept getting higher and higher, nntil it felt
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to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything
then to have heen back in Illinois, but I hadn't the moral courage
to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. [When it was
found that Harris iiad left] it occurred to me at once that Harris
had heen as much afraid of me aa I had been of him. This was
a view of the question I had never taken before; hut it was one I
never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war,
I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though
I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that the enemy
had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson
was valuable.'
General Sherman always said that the difference between
himself and General Grant was that Grant never was afraid
of anything he could not see, while he was afraid of what
he could not see.
From this expedition. General Grant was sent to command
the distriet of Cairo. He had not been there long before he
was ordered to make a reconnoissance to the west side of the
Mississippi river, opposite Columbus, Kentucky, witb a view
to holding what force there was on that side of the river,
keeping them from moving out to the aid of some Confeder-
ates stationed at St. Francis, on the St. Francis river, which
another force of the Union army had gone to attiKîk.
General Grant said that when he started out be had no
idea of fighting, but when he got aboard the boat, he found
every man on board expected if they saw the enemy to at-
tack him. He further said, " I saw that if I met tbe enemy
and did not attack him, I would lose the confidence of those
men, and I made up my mind no matter what force I met
I would fight." Hence the result of Belmont. It was not
a big battle, but was one of the first in the West, and firet
drew the attention of the West to Grant.
When General Grant got hack to Cairo he found the
enemy's line of defense stretched from Columbus, on the
Mississippi river, due east to Fort Henry on the Tennessee,
Fort Donelson on the Cumberland and due east to Bowling
Green in Kentucky, and as a trained soldier he began to
study the line and how to break it. He decided that the
way to break it was to attack its center by way of either the
'Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, v. 1, pp. 249-50.
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Tennessee or the Cumberland river and he immediately wrote
to General Halleck his views. The letter received such a
response ilmt Grant did jiot know whether he had made a
practical su^jgestion or not. Ilowever, it was still in his
mind and he obtained leave to go to St. Louis to consult
General Iíalleck in relation to Ihe views with which he was
so strongly imbued. lie said when he went into the office
und SHW General Halleck. he was received with so little
cordiality that he tliought he had stated the subject of his
visit with less clearness tlian he might have done. He had
not uttered many sentences before he was cut short as if his
plan was proposiprnns. and he returned to Cairo very much
crestfallen.
On his return to Cairo, General Grant did not give his
plan np. Commodore Foote was then in command of what
was known as the "Tin Clad Fleet" on tbe Mississippi river,
and having his headquarters near, General.Grant consulted
him. knowing that General Haileck had confidence in his
judgment. The Commodore saw immediately the strength of
the plan and wrote to General Halleek, who then wrote to
General Grant aud authorized him to go as far up the Ten-
nessee river with his force as tn capture Fort Henry. There
he was to stop, but as soon as he took Fort Henry he im-
mediately marched on Donelson. notifying Halleek of the
move and that he should go and capture Donelson unless
he was stopped. He captured Donelson and as soon as lie
captured it witJi all the rebel forces thero. General Grant,
in his own mind, knowing that BucU was marching from
Bowling Green toward Nashville, said, *'If Buell and I can
join our forces, the enemy are so demoralized and I have
captured so Jiiany of them, there is nothing to prevent us
from moving from here immediately to Vicksburg and open-
ing the Mississippi river."
General Grant visited Nashville to consult Buell on his
j)lan and he gives his reason as follows;
If one general who would have taken Üie responsibility
had been in command of all of the troops west of the Alle-
ghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth,
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Memphis and Yir-ksburg with the troops we then had, and as
volunteering was going on rapidly over the North there would
soon have been force enough at all these centers to operate
offensively against any body of the enemy tbat might be
found near them. Rapid movements and the acquisition of
rel)ollious territory would have promoted volunteering, so
that reinforcements could have been had as fast as trans-
portation could have been obtained to can-y them to their
destination. On the other hand, there were tens of thousands
of strong a,ble-bodied young men still at their home.s in the
southwestern States, who had not gone into the Confederate
army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire
fo go. If our lines had been extended to protect their homes,
many of them never would have gone. Providence ruled
differently. Time was given the enemy to collect armies and
fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near
forcing his northwestern front up to the Ohio river.*
General Grant was relieved because, as Halleck stated to
McClellan, they could get no reports or dispatches from him;
they could not hear from him ; they didn 't know where he was ;
he had gone outside of his command and was guilty of vio-
lation of the regulations and his orders. McClellan, after
receiving several dispatches of this tenor, authorized Hal-
leck to relieve nnd if necessary arrest Grant, but in a few
days they discovered that all of Grant's dispatches went to
a telegraph operator who was a rebel, who took the dispatches
and instead of sending them tn Ilalleck sent them to the rebels.
General Halleek in his dispatch declared General C. F. Smith
had won the battle, and recommended his promotion to l\Tajor
General.
Instead of following the plan of Grant, which was very
feasible, Buell's and Grant's armies lay there nearly two
months before they moved to Pittsburg Landing. In the
meantime, as we read the Confederate records now, the enemy
were completely demoralized. They had no army in our
front. They thought that Buell and Grant would immedi-
ately move forward into tbeir own country, as Grant pro-
posed, and were greatly astonished tbat they did not. They
»Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, v. l. pp. 81T-18.
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could not understand it. In the meantime they gathered
courage and organized a force under General Alhert Sidney
Johnston, concentrating it at Corinth.
General Grant, in referring to his troubles with Halleck
wrote a letter to his wife that states more clearly than I can
the position he was in and the reasons for his being relieved
of his command. He \Yi*ote as follows :
All the slander you have seen against me originated away from
where I was. The only foundation was the fact that I was ordereä
to remain at Port Henry and send the expedition up the Tennesset!
river under command of Major Genera! C. F. Smith. This was
ordered because of Fort Donelson. The same thing occurred with
me. I was not receiving the orders, but knowing my duties, wa.s
reporting daily, and when anything occurred to malte it necessary,
two or three times a day. When I was ordered to remain behind, it
was the cause of much disappointment among the troops of my com-
mand and aiso of astonishment. When I was again ordered to join
them, they showed, I believe, heartfelt joy.
I never allowed a word of contradiction to go out from my
headquarters, thinking this the best course. I know, though I do
not like to speak of myself, that General Halieck would regard
this army badly ofE if I were relieved. Not hut what there are
generals with it abundantly ahle to command, but because it would
leave Inexperienced officers senior in rank. You need not fear but
what I will come out triumphantly; I am pulling no wires, as politi-
cal generals do, to advance myself. I have no future ambitions.
My object is to carry on my part of this war successfully, and I am
perfectly willing that others may make all the glory they can out
of it.*
This letter is characteristic of General Grant.
When General Grant was removed. General C. F. Smith
was assigned to the commiand with instructions to move the
army to Savannah and Pittsburg Landing. Soon after Gen-
eral Halleck received General Grant's reports of his cam-
paign and ascertained the reason for the delay in receiving
his dispatches, he reinstated him in command of the army
and he proceeded to Savannah and relieved General C. F.
Smith, who was sick at the time and soon after died.
Grant went to Savannah with no idea o£ holding his army
there but of coneentrating lus forces on the west side of the
*P. D. Grant.
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Tennessee river and moving immediately upon Albert Sid-
ney Johnston'.s force, no matter where it was. There has
been a great deal of criticism of General Grant and General
Sherman and all the generals at Shiloh, but there is only
one thing that might be fairly criticised, and that was when
General Smith landed the green troops on the west side of tihe
river, he did not intrench them. We learned something from
the failure to do that; it was a good lesson. From that time
our army never stopped anywhere where there was an enemy
•ear our front that we did not intrench ; in fact, every sol-
dier buried himself before he went to sleep. But we did not
know anything about throwing up intrenchments then.
General Grant in his conversation with us after Shiloli
said tbat when lie knew the enemy had all their men in action
during the day and yet he had been able to hold them, he had
no doubt by midnisrht of the first day, that with Wallace's
twelve tihoasand men who had not fired a gun, he would have
been able to defeat Beauregard in the morning and march on
Corinth. When Buell eame it was doubly sure. The two
armies combined made a much, larger force than Beauregard's
army.
Grant then said in a telegram that in two days he could
take Corinth if he were allowed, but Halleek ordered tihem
not to go beyond a certain point until he arrived. That order
of General Halleek's was the reason why Grant is criticised
for not going forward when he had Buell's army and his
own. Grant was satisfied Corinth could have been captured
in a two days' campaign made immediately after Shiloh, with-
out any additional reinforcements. After Corinth they had
a movable force of 81.000 men, besides sufficient force for
holding all territory acquired in any campaign. New Orleans
and Baton Rouge were ours, and the enemy had only a
single line of railroad from Vicksburg to Richmond, and in
one move we had the opportunity to occupy Vicksburg and
Atlanta without much opposition, but we continued to pursue
the policy of distributing this great army and for nearly a
year accomplished no great results from it, giving up the
territory back to Nashville, holding only the line from the
Tennessee river to Memphis.
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As soon as General Halleck took command, General Grant
was virtually relieved. He was second in command. That
means nothing. I have heard General Grant say that when
they were approaching Corinth he proposed that he should
take what was known as the Army of the Mississippi under
General Pope and swing to the south of Corinth on the
enemy's communication and fiank Beauregard out of Corinth
or make him come o\it and fight. But he says in his state-
ment in relation to it that it was turned down so promptly
and abruptly that he thought possibly he had made an un-
itiilitary suggestion.
It was not long until Beauregard was driven out of Corinth,
and General Halleck was called to Washington by President
Lincoln to the conunand of the armies. General Grant, instead
of being put back into the place ]ie was entitled to, the com-
mand of the army, was simply given the command of the dis-
trict of west Tennesset!, the same district that I commanded
afterwards, and it was quite a time before he was given the
higher command of the Army of the Tennessee. Up to this
time our Government and tlie officers in Washington had no
confidence in Grant for some reason, and it is hard to tell why.
A criticism made by a staff oflScer to me of this action of
General Halleck's in not giving Grant the command of the
Army of tlie Tennessee, and of the fact of Halleck, who had
never fought a battle, being selected to go to Washington and
take command of all the armies, shows the views at that, time
of men who were under General Grant and knew him:
As one reads the reports and makes comparisons, first Grant fight-
ing at every opportunity, winning every battle, planning to move
on the enemy after every battle, but stopped, humiliated after each
campaign, and finally when given a command only allowed a district,
while on the other hand Halleck, who had not fought a battle, who
took fifty-five days or more with two men to the enemy's one to
make twenty miles, which by a simple fiank movement coulû have
heen accomplished in two days, with one of the best opportunities
of the war to capture or destroy an army of 50,000 men, Halleck
who prevented Grant from reaping the full benefit of every hattle
he fought, is brought to Washington and given full command of
all the armies, while Grant was not even allowed to resume com-
mand of the department he vacated, the record Is most astonishing.
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Halleck had no confidence in Grant, The officers in the field looked
on in amazement, and wondered what the powers in Washington
could be thinking about. Grant accepted whatever was given him,
never making a word of protest or complaint.*
Right after Shiloli, (Jeneral Grant was left with about ñfty
thousand men. The army of General Buell was moved to Cliat-
tanooga up the Tennessee river, projxising to ot-cujiy that coiiii-
ti\v. hut the enemy forced him clear to I^ >uisviUe, so that all
tlie ground wt- had gained was lost, except the line from the
Temiesscc river to Mi-mphis. includin<r west Tennessee, which
Grant had to occupy with his fifty th<msand men. And the
result was the enemy took advantage of this condition and
bi'oiiülit oViT- from Iho west of the Mississippi river. Generals
Viiii Dorn and Price and all their t'oi-ces. They combined on
Grant and the battles of Iuka and Corinth were fought and
won, and General Grant says this was the most anxious period
of liis service. He was not satisfied with General Rosecrans.
who did not follow up the enemy as he ordered hiiu to do.
and tliere was a great deal of friction among the officers there,
so that General Grant did not think that we reaped the full
results of the battle. However, he said nothing about that at
the time. Generals MfPherson and Ord and those officers
that were there made a very strong protest t« Grant in relation
to the action of General liosci-rans and against his official re-
port.
Just at that timo, two days after ttie battlo. I was in com-
mand of tlie Central Division of the Mississippi and had jtist
ñnished the railroad from Columbus to Humboldt. I was down
at Humboldt attending personally to the work, when I re-
ceived a dispatch trom (;<>n(.'ral Graut, through General Quim-
by, my commanding officer, to report immediately to Corinth
and take command of the second division of the Army of the
Tennessee. I was dressed in a working blouse, only I had my
shoulder straps on. There was a train just starting south.
I went aboard this train. When I reached Jackson, Ten-
nessee, which was General Grant's headquarters. Col. Raw-
lins, his Chief of Staff, came aboard the train and asked the
conductor if I was aboard. The conductor brought Rawlins
* Dodge Record.
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t« nif*. It was the first time I had ever seen him. He said
(iencral (¡rant was on the plfitforni and wished to speak to
me. T said to Colonel Kawlins, "1 am not properly tb-esscd
to meet the Commander in Chief." Rawlins laughed and
said, "You never mind about that; we all know about you."
I went out U) the platform and General Grant met me very
cordially. Tie was no better dressed than I was. so that I
was greatly relieved and felt at ease immediately. lie thanked
me for what I luul beou doing, and was very complinien1ai*>-
in praising the work I had ficcomplished in robuildin<r the
railrofid in so short a time, and then lie said, " I have assigned
you to the Second Division of the Army of the Tennessee,
and I want you to understand that you are not going down
there to coninmnd a division of cowards." I had not then
heard anytliing of tho friction at Corinth. I did not know
what he nieniit and I (H)uld not ask him, and, of course, I
said nothing, but thanked him. When I got to CorintK I
ascertained that General liosci-miis in his report had de-
nounced the second division comnuuided by General Davies
as being a division of cowards because they fell back into
the town, holding it when attaoked by an overwhelming force
of the enemy.-- On protest of General Davies, General Grant
returned this report to General Ros'ecrans for correction,
who. after investigating the matter, recalled the denunciation
of the division, stating that he made it ou the report of a
staff officer.
As to the protests that were sent by Generals McPherson.
Ord. ])avies and other officers. General Grant, as a soldier,
said right, off: " I cannot relieve General Rosecrans; he has
alniady fought two f)attles and won tbem." Then these offi-
cers iip))eale<l to ^Ire. ("irant. You know when she came to
visit rieiicral Grant, any one who had grievances they did
not like to take tn (¡rant, took them to Mrs. Grant, who was
always very kind She used tn sfiy to us, " I Ija.ve no influence
with TTlysst'S* nn tliese que,stious but I will speak to him about
it." Mrs. (¡rant, in speaking tn me afterwards, said she
talked to the General and told him how all the men felt about
"Tlip ••nfmy lin.vp slnco come hi on the Chewalla roail und have
driven in Davies' h-fl. Our m.-n (Hd not ac"t or ñght well. 1 -Jiink
we shall hEindle thein.—Ut-bcUior Records, ser. I. v. 17. pt. 1, p. 100.
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General R<iserran's report. Slic snid il irrmtly disturbed him
but he refused to take any action, ami that the next niorniti^ ^
he caint' out of his tent vvitli a dispatcli in his hand, waving
it with great glee, and snid : "Julia, see this! It settles our
troubh^s alrofidy.'' lie had in his hand a dispatch from the
War Depailmcnt relieving General K i^secrans imm the com-
mand at Connth and appointing him to the command of the
De])artnu-nt; and Army of the ('uniherland. General Grant
said he believed he would be a success there and that he thought
he would do hotter as a commanding officer tlian he did in a
.subordinate position.
After the faihirc of Grimt and Sliennan'.s first niovemcnf
on Vii'ks-hut'g. General (iraiit iimiicdiatcly Jiiade preparations
for the second Vicksburg campaign. It is generally supposed
he formed his plans of going to the rear of Vicksburg. long
after he got into tliat country, but that is not true. lie had
formed these plans before he st.art«d, hut he says lie did not
dare divulge Ihem even to his staff officcrs or to report them
to the War Dcjjartment because iie knew if he should make
them known, they would be disapproved and his campaign
stopped, as thi'y were eontfary to the military strategy and
science tlicn taught, lie. therefore. kei)t them in his own
mind. For a km^ time, high water in the Mississippi river
bli)ek<'d his progress. So while waiting for the river to fall,
lie kejit his army busy trying every other plan that seemed
feasible, until lie cnukl run the l>atteries and JIMHTII his army
to a position belinv A i^cksbiirg. where he could cross the
.Mivsissippi Hvi'r and go around Vicksburg and carry out his
[iliuis. I state this because there are a groat many who
cJiiiined after thr uaj' that the plan of going to the .south
and roar of Vicksbui-ii i-nmc fnuii other officers, but (írant
states in his Mcniqii-s fully ¡uni frankly his |>lKns' of thitit
campaijin, and we know he never made a statement tlmt was
uni true. General (_irfint said to me that tho i)olitii-iil situ-
ation in the North was such Ihat unless he luid carried (»ut
this original plan he would have had to fall back to Memiihis
again and renew the ültempt by land. The excitt-ment in the
Nortli was such ttiat, this movement would have caused the
election to have gone against the administration, and that
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alone, he thought, justified him in taking the great ehances
he did in this the greatest piece of strategy and ttie boldest
and most successful that has been written iu history.
As soon as the city of Vicksburg was captured, almost the
very day, General Grant proposed to tbe Government tbat
he should take his victorious army and move immediately on
Mobile, but the Government had other plans and ordered
that magnificent army, 70,000 stnmg to be again diatributtHÎ.
General Parks' Ninth Corps which came from east Ten-
nessee, was immediately sent back there. General Sherniaji,
with the Fifteenth Corps, was sent to Memphis and started
east aeross the country. He did not know where he was
going. AVhen he reached me at Corinth he said he had no
idea what his objective point was. His orders were to go up
the Tennessee river valley and rebuild the Memphis and
Charleston road as he marched. So you see thei-e is another
case where a veteran army, after a great campaign, could
have moved forward, and in a month or two they could have
captured Mobile, or. as an army, tliey could have gone any-
where over the South.
After General Sherinan got to Bear river he received Gen-
eral Grant's orders to take with him the Fifteenth and Six-
teenth Aniiy Corps and march as fast as possible to Chatta-
nooga.
President Lincoln, against the adviee of his Cabinet, sent
General Grant around to take command of Chattanooga after
the failure at Chiokamauga; in fact they first tried to get
Genera] Thomas ti) take command of that army before they
sent for General Grant.
On the 21st day of December, 1863, General Grant called
to Nashville the officers he proposed to use in his next cam-
paign. Generals Sherman, Sheridan, Rawlins and myself
were there. General MePherson had gone north on a leave
of absence. General Logan and the Fifteenth Corps were to
be left at Huntsville. General Blair and the Seventeenth
Corps were on the Mississippi river.
We were a sorry-looking lot, as our army had been iiway
from any base of supplies for nearly a year and we were
CHAKACTERISTICS OF GEN. U. S. GRANT 581
poorly clad, most of us wearing soldiers-' overcoats. As soon
as we reported, General Grant suggested that we call upon
the militai-y governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson. We
found him in îii fint; mansion. He received us cordially and
immediately opened with a tirade against the disloyal citizens,
denouncing them and declaring that while he commanded
Tennessee they need expect no favors from him. He was
forceful in his talk and while speaking brought his fist down
upon a piano, by which he was standing, with such foree thajt
you could hear it all over the room. We left immediately
after this speech. No one made any comment but every one
thought his tirade uncalled for. I had some experience with
him as my corps wintered in middle Tennessee and had to
subsist off tho country, and ever>' time I foraged on a prom-
inent rebel, I felt (iovcrnor Jolms<)D tryiny; to stop it.
After returning to Grant's headquarters, we took dinner;
then General Sherman suggested that we go to the theatre,
and all agreed. The army was then veteranizing nnd the
theatre was full of soldiers on leave or returning. We all
paid our way in, taking sí.íats in the balcony. No one knew
we were in Nashville. The play of "Hamlet" was on and it
was being nuirdered. General Sherman was a fine Shakes-
pearian scholar. I sat next to him and he criticised the play
severely and loudly. \ cautioned him and said. " Sherman,
keep still : these l)oyK down in the pit will discitvcr yon find
then there will be a scene here." Just at that lime, there
came on the grave digger's .scene, where the actor soliloquizes
on Yorick's skull, holding it in his hand. As he got altnut
the middle of his discourse, a soldier way back in the rear, a
tall man. stood up and yelled. "Say, pnrd, what is it î Tunk
or Riíb ? ' ' The house came down in one great roar and General
Grant said we better get out of there, and we got out.
Sherman then said, "Let's go and get some oysters." We
hadn't had any for a year, and he put General Tinwlins for-
ward to find the place. He took us to a very fair saloon.
We wcnti in; the place was nearly full, there was only one
large table tluit would seat all of us and one nuin occupied
it. There was a smaller table next to it. You know what a
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ntodest iiian Knwlins wa.s. l ie went up to this man and asked
him if he would .just HH soon take the side table there, and
lot our [larty have the large one. He didn't tell him who
the party Avas, Itnt the fellow looked at hint, and said. " I
'/uess tbis table is good enough fnr me." Kawiins said, *'I
think we hail better get out of here." So out we went.
Shermaii Ihen wi*nt 1'or Riiwlins and said if we depended upon
him wf would ljiivcr get anything to eat. so Sherman hailed
il police officer, and be sbowed us a basement where there
was an oyster siilotui kept by a wi<la\v. We went in there
and ordered nur oysters. That was the first time we had all
gotten together tr> talk, and instead of eating oysters as we
should have doue, we went on talking to each other. Twiîlve
o'clock approEiehed and tlie wonièin came to us and said, " W e
are obliged to close up at twelve o'clock," and askod us to
pay our liill. We wcrt^ obU<red to get out of there, having-
eatéit Oîjly half of tiie oysters. We wont to General Grant's
headituarti-rs wln-rc u\' camiied ïitr the night. Wlien we got
iMU'k, we liad to tell the story of what occurred during the
evening to the staff, and the ])aper.s had it in the morning:.
Before Genera! (írnni was np. the proprietor of the theatre.
the saloon mnn where Rawlins irot downed mid the widow who
turned us out were all U|) at head(|iiarters expecting t^ be
punislied, I .suppose, for the way tliey bail treated the com-
tiiaiiding frenerjil of the army, but they got to General Grant
and he said, "That is all right; you obeyed your order."
In the morniuíT. I remeniber, fíeneral Grant took us to a
hack room oí Ihe hnusc he oecupicil as headquarters, and
liiid down Iiis pliin for tbe winter campaign. He did not
propose that his army should lay still Ihat winter. His plan
was this: he was to lake thirty thonsand niei. from the Ohat-
tiinooga force, go down the Ohio and Slissis.'dppi rivera to
Xew Orleans, there take boats anil with the navy make a
t'ombined attack on Mobile. Sherman was to go to Vicksburg,
and with the Seventeenth Corps, whieh then lay at Vicksbiü*ar,
iind what force lie ''ould gatlicr along tbe Mississippi river,
mnve from ^'icksburg on ;\leridiaii, and then as soon as Grant
landed at iîobile, was to move down aud join him. I was to
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liike tlie Sixteeiitli Army Corps and some ten thousand cjivalry
lliat had lloen organized by (Jeneral William Sooy Smith a t
and wjis to move south as far as the Tcmbiybee
to sweep west into ^lississippi, meet Forres t andthen
ilrivo him out. and swiug aronnd by Corinth, destroying all
llie i-nilroat1s and sn|)|)lios in that country, and return to
iiiiddlf Tennessee. (íeiKMvil (iraut's theory was to destroy
nvorything in ilississippi. Tennessee and all tliat territory,
so tiiat th? enemy could not occupy it again, and tben in
the sprii^glho could concontrate all his forces for the spring
cunipaigníí. Ile believed that if he eaptnred Mobiles he conUI
move by the Alabijniii river ¡is ¡i base, capture Selma and
Moutgoniei'y ¡md app'-oiicli (ieoi-gia on that line, having a
Wilier base iiiste.-nl ol" tlie Intiiï raili'oad liju! from Louisville
wliicli we liJid to protect in (Hit- Atilinta eanijíaign.
We all ifturncd tn our coniniands prepared for tlio move-
ment, but when General Grant i)resented his plans to Wasli-
ington. President Lincoln disapproved of it for tliis reason—
he wiis íifríiid if Grant took tliirty thousand men from Chatta-
ruwga, Loníístreet. who was encamped up east of Knosville,
wintering in east Tennessee, would come back and retake
('hattanooíía. But. Grunt considered that the forces he had
left at Chattanooga and in cast Tennessee were amjile to bold
all that country. Tbis decision of Lincoln's was a great dis-
appointment to (¡cneral (Jrnnt, so much so that he itmiiediately
went to Kniisville himself witb the intention of taking the
force that was at Knoxville under General Foster and going
out to attinîk Longstrcet and drive him out of east Tennessee,
and tlien cominy: hack and continuing his campaign. But
when he got to Knoxville he found tlie winter so severe that
Fnster and the forces there thought they could not accom-
[ilish what he desii'ed of them, lie thought he liad no time
ti) bring other forws there, and titially concluded that Foster
with his forces were doing l>etter holding Longstreet than to
attempt a winter campaign and perhaps not succeed.
(¡rant afterwards sai<l to us one of the mistakes he made
was that he did not carry out his original plan to attack
Longstreet: tlicrel'nre. no part of his plan was carried out
except that General Slierman went to Vicksburg and inarched
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out to Jleridian without meeting any force, and destroyed
the railroad. General William Sooy Smith with a cavalry
force undertook to join him. but was attacked and defeated
by Forrest in Mississippi aud fell back to Memphis, so that.
nothing was done the whole winter and we all lay there, those
great armies, from the time of the battle at Chattanooga
until the next May. without accomi)lishing anything. This
was the tliird plan of General (îrant's that was turned down
by the Government.
When (ienci'al Grant came back from Washington about
March 21, 18fj4, he called us again to Nashville and laid be-
fore us his plan for that year's (campaign. lie told us of his
visit to Washintrtou and what President Lincoln said to him
and what he said to the President. I will not go into that,
only this far. that (¡eneral («rant accepted his comniand ujjon
the condition that iiis plans should not be interfered with;
that he should have a light to carry them out on his own
judgment and that all the staff departments should he placed
under his command. Every i;ne who was in the service knew
how difficult it was in the tield to get ¡)ronipt action from the
stfiff departments, especially the ciiuniiissary and qnarter-
master departments; tliey claimed allegiaiu-e only to the War
Department, and the staiï departments in AVashington did
not recognize the authority of any commanding general in
the field. Tlie reason of that is because by law they were
subject ouly to the order of the Secretary of War. Mr. Lin-
coln answered (General Grant's re(|uest tty saying, " I cannot
give the order that tlie staff departments at Washington
shall obey .you," but he said, "General (Jrant, there is no
authorit.v here to order tliem to disobey your order but me
and you can rest assured I shall not." And he said, " I think
if your order comes up here, it will lie obeyed."
General Grant laid down the principle which had always
Iwen in his mind, that every Tnion army in the field that
faced a rebel army should move against it on a certain day
and fight it until one or the other was destroyed or cap-
tured. I heard him say to (ieneral Hhennan when he laid
down the plan that lie was going to move on the first day of
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Ma.y: "Now, General Sherman, I expect you to keep so close
to Johnston and give him so mueh to do that he cannot take
¡my part of his army and send it to Lee. And I say to you
that if Lee sends any portion of his command to Jolmston. I
will send you two men to his one.''
Under the theory of some of our leading officers which pre-
vailed for nearly three years in otir war, it was not good policy
or strategy for two of our armies to fight at the same time.
The tlieory was that if one ol: them should be wliipped they
eould not succor each other. Grant's theory was that every
man in the field from tbe beginning of the war to the end,
every armed force, should move upon the enemy and keep
them busy. The enemy had the interior lines and therefore by
keeping them busy, they could not do as they did when our
army in the West was lying still while there was fighting in
the East, and the western rebel forces were sent e^st. Then
wht'i) onr aniiy in tbe AVest was figlitiiig, the Army of the
Potomac would be lying still, and Lnngstreet and a great
many others were sent to the West. So that in fact while
Ihey talk a great deal about prépondérance in numbers, tlKMT
were very few battles fought in the Civil war where there
were not as many of the enemy facing us as there w^ ere men
on our side. It was just that policy of handling their forces
and sending them where the fighting was going on that Grant
said in this meeting of the 21at he proposed to stoi).
After I got a Confederate leave at Atlanta, General Grant
in OetJiber, 18t>4, sent for me to come to City Point. iK'fore
General Sherman marehett to the sea. 1 went down there and
spent teu days with General Grant and saw tlie armies of the
Potomac and James. General (¡rant was tliinkin^ of giving
lue command there but General liawlins ach ised me not to
take it. AK we .sat around the camp-fire in the evenings. Gen-
eral Grant told me the difficulties he had met in his campaigns
from the Wilderness to the James river and of lus suc-
ces.ses and his defeats. The real fact is that in the movement
of May 1, 1864, there were only three armies successful ; those
commanded liy Grant, Sherman and Sheridan. Banks was a
failure up the Red River. Hunter, a splendid officer, was
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overpowered in thi- Slieniindoiih valley, thüngh at first he
nearly reached Lynehhurg, Vii-ginia. Sigel was defeated
and driven out of the valley and Butler was defeated at Ber-
mutla Hundred.
There was great criticism of (irant in the East because he
had not destroyed or captured Lee's anny, and when I left
General Grant I returned by way of Washington and had
a long and interesting intei-\-iew with President Lincoln on
Grant and his campaign«. To show the feeling, as Lincoln
pointed out. of the Staff and the War Department and the
Cabinet at Washington toward Gran! and his- cainiiaigns. I
give the dispatpli that Grant sent and Lincoln's answer.
Wlten Early <lf'fefitïHl onr forces in the Slienandoah valley,
Grant wanted tn send Sheri<lan there. 1'liere was great op-
position to that in Washington; hut he finally sent him
against tlieir protests and dispatched this word to General
Halleck:
I want Sheridan pnt in command of all the troops in the field,
with instructions to put himself south of the enemy ajid follow
him to the death. Wherpver the enemy goes let our troops go also.^
This was disrcí.ríirding tli(í timidity that kept a large force
dodging to the right and left in front of Wasliiniiton for
Tear the enemy might otherwise slip up and ciipture the
idty. Lincoln got hold of this telepram some way. «nd sent
this clinractcristifi dispati'li to General Grant. It is a ver>'
important dispatch because it sliows thjtt Lim.'oln liad ab-
solutely lost all faith in everybody around him in Washing-
ton. He saiil :
This, I think, is exactly right as to liow our forceo should move,
l)ut please look over the dispatches you may have received from here
pven since you made that order, and discover, if you ean. that there
¡B any idea in the head of any one here of "putting our army
south of the enemy," or of "foliowirig him to the deatli" In any di-
rection. I repeat to you. it will neither be done nor attempted,
unless you watch it every day and hour and force it.'
Think of that coming from tbe President of the United
States with everybody subordinate to him, telling Grant un-
less he went there in person and saw that bis order was car-
"Retellion Records, ser. I, v. 37, pt. 2, p. 558,
'Robelllon Rpcorda, aer. Ï, v. 37, pt. 2, p. 582.
CHARACTERISTICS OF GEN. Ü. S. GUANÍ 587
ried out it would uot be done. Graut inunediately weut to
Wasiiiiitrtdu himself tnul put Slioridan in (ionmiantl. and you
all know what Sheridan did.
Now, when we read the war reeortfs we see tliat there was
110 reason why eai:h one of (irajit's recommendatious made
after every battle should not have been adopted. Distribut-
inir liis annies with a view to holding territory, instead of
attacking the enemy, which was Grant's policy, was a fatal
mistake, and the policy advanced that while one army was
lighting a battle tlii> others should be held in reserve aud in-
tai'l was also fatal to carrying out Grant's policies. Again,
even atter all of (inmt's great victories, up to 1864, the
only person in Wasliington in the Cabinet and in the War
Defiarlnient who luul faith in General Grant was President
ijiiH'oln. As we look at the (juestinn after reading all the
reports, it is evident if any one of Gi-ant's gn-at plans had
been eai-ried out after Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg or Chatta-
nooga, the West would have been freed of any jrreat rebel
I'lirees and the greater part of our forces in the West would
have been concentrated in the East. Wlien the ofßcei-s near
Genoral (ïraut discussed these questions with him, his answer
at the time they occurred was that no doubt the authorities
at Wasliington had good reasons for their actions which we
did uot know of; that we were only looking at one part of
the great problem. But in after years General Grant could
see Rft well as any one that every one of his jilans should
liavf! heen adopted, and that if onr armies had been kept
upon the move winter and summer, it would have brought
success to our forces and terminated tlie war.
(¡encrai Grant in discussing the criticisms upon him, said:
Twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever
known, we havR writers who profess devotion to thp nation trying
to prove that the nation's forcf's were not victorious. Probably they
say we were slashed around Donelson to Vickaburg and Chatta-
nooga, and in the East, Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physi-
cal rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. I would like to 8ee
truthful history written and history will do full credit to the
courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the American citizen,
no matter what section of thy country he hailed from, or in what
ranks he. fought.
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Speaking of those who opposed our country during the
war, Grant gave his opinion :
The man who obstructs a war in which hiß nation is engaged, no
matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life
or history. The most charitable posthumous history the stay-at-
home traitor can hope for is oblivion.
I saw a great deal of General Grant after the war, and
he was just the same in civil life that he was in the service.
If there was nothing doing. General Grant didn't do any-
thing himself. If you wrote him a letter or sent Mm a
dispatch when the campaign was not on, he was slow in
answering it, but the moment he got into the saddle, and
you sent a letter or a dispatch, it seemed as though you got
an answer before you had sent it. lie seemed to anticipate
just what you wanted. It was the same in civil life, so
that as President and as (íeneral of the army, if some occasion
Tor action arose, he met it and conquered it.
He stood high as a statesman abroad. I was all over Eu-
rope during the time he was President, and all the great civil
i|uestion8 that arose during his administration he met and
solved, and Europe looked upou him as highly as a statesman
as he had shown himself as a soldier.
He was so modest and simple that the impression of his
greatness was absolutely forced upon one from his very acts.
His simjilicity Eistonished the world. No critic in this nation
or any other has been able to write a word against his mili-
tary course or civil life which carried strength enough to lie
mentioned a second time. Grant's greatness was admitted
long before he left our shores, and although simply a citizen,
be was honored as no one ever was before. Some critics of
General Grant have said that during the war lie absorbed
from others many of his great (lualities a.s a soldier, but no
one can read the war records without seeing that the strength
of his dispatches and orders, the boldness of his plans, his
fearless attack of superior numbers and his decisive victories
in the early itnrt nf the war were equal to if not siiperior to
those of the last vcars of the war.
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The great distinguishing qualities of General Grant were
truth, courage, modesty, generosity and loyalty. He was loyal
to every work and every cause in which he was engaged; to
his friends, his family, his country, and his God, and it was
Ihesc eiiaraeteristies which lx)und to him v^•ith bands of steel
all those who served with him. He gave to others bouor and
praise to which he was himself entitled. No ofScer served
under him wlin did not understand this. I was a yonng man
and given nuich larger commands tlian my rank entitled me
to. Grant never failed to encourage me hy giving me credit
for whatever I did, or tried to do. If I failed he assumed
the responsibility; if I succeeded, he reconunended me for
promotion. He always looked at the intentions of those who
served under him as well as their acts. If they failed, he
dropped them so (juickly and efficiently that the whole coun-
try could see and hear their fall.
BURIAL OF BLACK HAWK.
The Iowa Gazette gives the following account of the hurial
of this celehrated chief :
"His body, we understand, was not interred, but was
I)laced on the earth in a sitting posture, with his eane clenched
in his hands, enclosed with slabs or rails. This is the manner
in which the chiefs of the Sac nation are usually buried, and
was done at his own special reque.st. A considerable number
of whites, we understand, were present at this disposition of
his remains."—Albany, N. Y., The Jeffersoman, November 3,
1838.

